This paper examines the determinants of aggregate flows of service trade in MENA countries using an adapted version of the gravity model and a panel dataset covering the 2000-2009 period for 21 countries and 10 sectors. A new determinant of trade performance is introduced: the number of commitments undertaken by sector in the WTO as well as the availability of those commitments by mode. The results show that being a WTO member boosts trade in services. In addition, the number of commitments and binding these commitments increase exports, imports and trade in services. This positive and significant effect remains robust even after controlling for several econometric issues, namely the selection bias related to the WTO membership and the endogeneity of commitments.
Introduction:
Trade in services is receiving increasing interest in the trade literature and in the negotiations under the GATS due to the importance of services in the global economy. Services currently account for approximately two thirds of world GDP and over half of total employment in industrialized countries . Given these figures, one may be surprised to see that the share of services in total trade falls behind, reaching 21% 3 of global trade flows in 2009 . If trade in services is underestimated due to the intangible nature of services and the interdependence of services and foreign direct investment flows that makes the measurement of services trade difficult, this low figure is also due to the important restrictions on trade in services.
In 2010, the major exporters of commercial services were the European Union, the United States, Japan, China and India, which together represented around two-thirds of world exports (WTO, 2011) . The share of developing countries remained low, although the performance of some countries was significantly improved in many directions. For instance, in some Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, trade in services, rather than trade in goods, appears as the core of their development strategies. Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have heavily invested in services to reduce their dependence on oil and further diversify their economy and exports. The Emirate of Dubai promoted tourism, which now contributes more than oil to the Emirate's GDP, as well as exports in information and communication technology, and media. Non-GCC countries are also performing well. For example, Morocco is becoming an important offshoring center for high-tech enterprises. Besides, the service sector has been an important source of value added growth and job creation in MENA countries during the latter half of the 2000s, irrespective of whether the country was an oil exporter or importer (World Bank, 2011) . Nonetheless, MENA's share in world service trade was only 4.8% in 2010 (author's calculations from WTO (2011)). Moreover, service trade only represented 19% of the region's GDP in 2009 although service value added accounted for more than 40% of GDP (author's calculations from the World Development Indicators database). These outcomes reveal serious competitiveness issues and raise the question of whether they are the consequence of the limited commitments for service liberalization. This paper investigates the determinants of service trade in MENA countries. This region has been widely neglected in the literature on service trade. Since we are interested in each country's trade performance in services instead of bilateral service trade flows, we use an adapted version of the gravity model, taking into account unilateral variants of those variables that have been found to influence bilateral trade. We also introduce a new determinant of trade WTO members only. However, this regression may suffer from a selection bias given the fact that WTO commitments are observed for WTO members only. To control for this problem, we run a Heckman two-stage selection model. First, we examine the determinants of being a WTO member using a host of institutional variables. Then, we determine the impact of the number of commitments by sector as well as the availability of those commitments by mode on trade in services. Finally, we notice an endogeneity problem arising from the fact that countries may have commitments in those sectors where they trade well. To fix it, we instrument WTO commitments with institutional variables, given that countries with better institutions are more likely to have commitments in services at the WTO. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on service trade in the MENA region. Section 3 describes the methodology adopted. Section 4 is dedicated to data analysis. Section 5 exhibits the econometric results and section 6 concludes.
Stylized Facts
The service sector currently represents 42.39% of total GDP in the MENA region (Table  1) , lagging behind all the other regions, the developed ones like North America (77.35%) and Europe (73.55%) as well as the developing ones like Sub-Saharan Africa (57.2%). While the share of service value added in GDP tends to rise significantly with the countries' level of income, standing at 73.43% on average in high income countries, against 55.3% and 49.91% respectively in middle and low income countries, the picture looks different when MENA countries are analyzed individually. In most countries, the production of services is a core economic activity although significant differences exist between different income groups as well as within the same group. For instance, in some high-income economies like Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, services represent around 40% of GDP while in Malta, another high-income country, they account for 65.19% of GDP, which is above the share of both industry and agriculture. Also, in some lower and upper middle income countries like Djibouti, Lebanon and Jordan, the share of the service sector in GDP is around 70% while in others like Iraq and Libya, it barely reaches 20%. Besides, it is worth noting that, with some exceptions, the general trend is an increase in the share of services in GDP between 2000 and 2009. The biggest increase was of 18 percentage points, in Malta, due to the surge of financial services and tourism, followed by an increase of 8 percentage points in Lebanon and Syria. Growth was concentrated in tourism, construction and telecommunication services in Syria and Lebanon. To these are added the banking sector as well as retail and wholesale trade in Lebanon. The current importance of services as reflected by their contribution to GDP is also mirrored in employment statistics. Given these figures, one may be surprised to see that trade in services as a percentage of GDP lags behind, representing only 19.4% of total GDP in the MENA region ( Figure 1 ). However and surprisingly, this figure is the highest among regions and in comparison with the averages for low, middle and high income countries. Such a high share of trade in services in GDP is mainly due to countries like Lebanon and Malta whose figures are respectively 88.59% and 81.37%. Figure 1 also shows that significant differences exist between countries within the same income Moreover, when we observe the share of services in total trade, the picture does not look brighter ( Figure 2 Once trade is disaggregated into exports and imports, we can notice that the share of services in total exports and total imports is still low, respectively 19.96% and 32.02% ( Figure  3) . At the country level, the picture is different. Lebanon, Malta and Djibouti exhibit high shares of services in total exports (above 60%), and much lower shares of services in total imports. By contrast, service exports in Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Oman represent a small percentage of total exports (below 10%) while service imports account for a much bigger share of total imports. However, this is not the case of all MENA countries. Table 3 shows that Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia are all net exporters of services. In 2009, Egypt was the biggest net exporter of services followed by Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon. With some exceptions, the trade surplus of net exporters increased between 2000 and 2009. By contrast, the trade deficit of net importers exacerbated over years. At the sectoral level, the MENA region had a revealed comparative advantage in mainly all sectors in 2008 except travel, computer and information services, other business services, when the measure is calculated based on export data (Table 4) . However, the revealed comparative advantage measure based on net exports is only greater than one for sectors like travel, financial services, royalties and license fees as well as other business services. This measure is also negative for sectors like insurance services, computer and information services, and personal, cultural and recreational services as well as for remittances. For insurance services and computer and information services, the negative figure is mainly due to Israel. For personal, cultural and recreational services, the negative figure is mainly due to Malta. In general, trade in services is hampered by barriers to commercial establishment such as foreign ownership caps and joint venture obligations, restrictions on types of commercial presence and number/type of services that can be provided, discriminatory registration requirements and licensing procedures, nationality and residency requirements, economic needs tests and discriminatory treatment advantaging domestic companies over the foreign ones. The economy-wide costs of these barriers can be significant. For instance, empirical evidence shows that the cost and quality of services inputs such as telecommunication, distribution, and financial intermediation are key determinants of the competitiveness of firms.
Where matters concern MENA countries in particular, poor and high-costs infrastructure services such as transport and telecommunications, storage and distribution reduce the competitiveness of MENA firms. Public monopolies in ports and port services, combined with poor infrastructure for loading and storing goods, results in high costs for traders. Monopoly shipping and domestic policies favoring national carriers result in low quality, low frequency, and high-cost services. Policies restricting trade in land transport servicesimpose high costs on intra-MENA trade. Examples include denial of visas for professional drivers of certain nationalities, arbitrary changes in documentary requirements, surcharges and discriminatory taxes, and prohibitions on obtaining cargo in the country of destination to take back to the country of origin.
The persistence of barriers to service trade in the region can also be illustrated by examining the state of WTO commitments . Table 5 presents the number of commitments by sector and by country in the MENA region. Two remarkable facts can be viewed: on the one hand, some countries such as Bahrain, Djibouti, Tunisia and Malta, do not have commitments for many sectors. On the other hand, some countries like Jordan, Egypt, Oman, Morocco and Kuwait have committed their trade in services for several sectors at the WTO. For this reason, our goal is to assess the impact of these commitments on these countries' trade in services. Source: WTO dataset.
Methodology
The methodology used in this paper draws on the pioneering work of Tinbergen (1962) and Anderson (1979) In this paper, we investigate the impact of WTO commitments on trade in services. This is why we propose an adaptation of the gravity model, using unilateral variants of those variables that have been found to influence bilateral trade (Lynden, 2011). These unilateral variants will be country-specific, instead of country-pair-specific to assess the determinants of trade in services in MENA countries.
Since eight countries out of twenty one are not members of the WTO, we first have to assess the impact of WTO membership on service flows. Our dependant variable is the value of service trade of country i in sector j at year t (ܺ ௧ ). Our explanatory variables are GDP, GDP of the rest of the world being the partner of the home country. Furthermore, we use unilateral variants of the gravity-type variables. For instance, we include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if twenty percent of the population speak English and zero otherwise (English20). We also include three dummy variables to determine whether a country has been colonized by France (Fr. Col), the United Kingdom (Eng. Col) or Spain (Spn. Col). Since most of our countries are located in the Arab region, two dummy variables are introduced to assess the impact of some preferential trade agreements within the region: the GAFTA and the Agadir agreements. The rationale behind is to examine whether these agreements promote trade in services. We capture the effect of distance by the variable latitude (Lat.). With the majority of rich countries being in temperate zones, the major markets are concentrated away from the equator. The closer a country is to the equator, the less it will trade, ceteris paribus. Finally, WTO is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is a WTO member and 0 otherwise. Therefore our estimable equation is:
( 1) with є ijt the discrepancy term.
We can assess the impact of WTO commitments for WTO members only, this is why we run (1) for them. However, this regression may suffer from a selection bias given the fact that the WTO commitments are observed for WTO members only. Since selection bias can be thought of as a form of omitted variable bias (Heckman, 1979) , we run a Heckman selection model to control for this problem. We adopt a two-stage analysis to tackle such an issue. In our first step, we examine the determinants of being a WTO member using a host of institutional variables and in the second step we determine the impact of WTO commitments on trade in services. The rationale behing using institutional variables as determinants of WTO accession arises from the real fact that, during the negotiation process, the newly acceded members undertake a number of engagements to redesign their domestic economic structure and legal framework. Indeed, according to Basu et al. (2009) , acceding countries have to deliver tangible results about changes in trade laws and regulations, not only by providing improved market access in goods and services, but also by making their trade regimes more transparent for business communities. In other words, the development of trade-related institutions such as the laws and regulatory frameworks that govern trade are crucial in terms of ensuring trade liberalization and guaranteeing benefits from the multilateral trading system.
Finally, it is quite clear that WTO commitments may suffer from an endogeneity problem since countries may have commitments in those sectors where they trade well. To control for the endogeneity of the WTO commitments, we instrument them using institutional variables, since countries having better institutions are more likely to have commitments in services at the WTO.
All these econometric issues allow us to properly assess the impact of the WTO commitments on trade in services in the MENA region.
Data
We focus on the MENA region given the importance of services for these countries and their low level of commitments at the WTO. Our dataset covers 21 MENA countries (13 WTO members and 8 non-members), 10 years (from 2000 to 2009) and 10 service sectors 7 .
We compile our dataset from different sources. First, for the WTO commitments, we use the WTO dataset that provides an exhaustive overview of the commitments by country, by sector and by mode of supply: mode 1 (cross-border supply); mode 2 (consumption abroad); mode 3 (foreign commercial presence); and mode 4 (movement of natural persons). Furthermore, we use the number of commitments by country and by sector that is provided by the WTO as well. Such commitments are all retrieved from the services' schedule for each WTO member. Furthermore, we have constructed unilateral variants of the gravity-type variables. First, language, colony and latitude variables have been compiled from the CEPII dataset available on www.cepii.fr. Second, we have constructed dummy variables related to preferential trade agreements (Agadir and GAFTA) and to the fact of being a member of the WTO using the respective official websites of these agreements/organizations.
The instruments that have been used to control for endogeneity come mainly from the Doing Business dataset (World Bank) that includes a host of institutional variables. The variables we took into account are time to trade, paying taxes (defined as total tax rate percentage of profit), procedures of enforcing contract and the cost of registering property (% of property value).
Results
In order to determine the impact of WTO commitments on trade in services, we will proceed in three steps. First, since some of our countries are not WTO members, we determine the impact of being a member of the WTO on trade in services. Second, we assess the impact of WTO commitments on trade in services. Third, we deal with some econometric issues related to the WTO commitments especially the endogeneity of these commitments and the selection bias that may affect our results.
First, it is worth mentioning that our gravity model is doing well since both GDP and GDP of the rest of the world have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. Yet, in our sample, the other variables do not affect trade in services: neither the language variable (20% of the population speaking English) which is positive but insignificant, nor latitude. Although bilateral distance is typically expected to have a negative impact on trade in goods, it is not clear from the existing literature that this is necessarily the case for services. Service products do not have to be physically transported from location to location. Some kinds of services require movement of physical persons, but others may be communicated electronically. Consequently, the importance of distance in services trade may be insignificant, as it is the case in this paper.
As per our variables of interest, Table 6 presents the panel results of being a WTO member. It is quite clear that the effect of WTO membership is statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect is positive on exports, imports and total trade. This shows to what extent service liberalization within the WTO framework promotes trade in services by creating a credible and reliable system of international trade rules, by stimulating economic activity through guaranteed policy bindings and by promoting trade through progressive liberalization. Interestingly, GAFTA and Agadir agreements seem to be ineffective in promoting trade in services. However, this result should be expected given that neither agreement has extended coverage to include free trade in services. Therefore, in order to deepen integration among Arab countries, these agreements should focus more on increasing commercial services.
Moving to the direct impact of WTO commitments on trade in services, Table 7 shows that the number of commitments has a positive statistically significant impact on exports, imports and trade in services meaning that the higher the number of commitments, the higher the level of trade in services. Yet, as it was mentioned before, the impact of WTO commitments can be examined for WTO members only, this is why we run the regression taking into account the potential selection bias affecting our results. As Table 8 shows, using a two-step Heckman technique, we find that institutional variables such as the time to trade, to register property and to enforce contracts have a highly significant impact on the probability of being a WTO member. In the second step, and even after controlling for the selection bias, we find that the number of WTO commitments still have a positive and significant impact on trade in services. The rationale behind is as follows: the more the country has commitments, the more it imposes a bound on any protectionist measure aiming at reducing trade in services. This is why the more a country binds its commitments, the less likely it imposes any measure aiming at protecting its market or discriminating between WTO members. Table 9 presents the panel results and takes the endogeneity problem into account. First, even when we consider the panel dimension of our dataset, the number of commitments is still positive and statistically significant pointing out the contribution of commitments to the increase of trade in services. However, these commitments may suffer from an endogeneity problem since a country may not have a commitment in a sector where it does not trade. Therefore, we instrument our potentially endogenous variable, namely the number of commitments, and find that its impact on exports, imports and trade remains positive and statistically significant.
Finally, in order to have a detailed analysis by mode, we run the regression by taking into account the impact of commitments by mode on trade in services (Tables 10 and 11 ). The "commitments by mode" variables measure whether the commitments are bound or not. Therefore, we find, after instrumenting these modes by the same institutional variables that have been used in instrumenting the number of commitments, that the four modes do have a positive and significant impact on service trade. Again, the commitments are virtually guaranteed conditions for foreign exporters and importers of services as well as investors to do business and to ensure that the partner country will not impose any unexpected restriction on international trade.
To sum up, it is quite clear that being a WTO member boosts trade in services. In addition, the number of commitments and binding these commitments increase exports, imports and trade in services. This positive and significant effect remains robust even after controlling for several econometric issues, namely the selection bias related to the WTO membership and the endogeneity of these commitments. 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
This paper investigates the determinants of aggregate flows of service trade in MENA countries. More specifically, we ask the following question: why do MENA countries trade as much or as little in services as they do. Since we are interested in each country's trade performance in services instead of bilateral service trade flows, we use an adapted version of the gravity model, taking into account unilateral variants of those variables that have been found to influence bilateral trade. We also introduce a new determinant of trade performance: the number of commitments undertaken by sector in the WTO as well as the availability of those commitments by mode.
Since eight out of twenty one MENA countries are not members of the WTO, we first assess the impact of WTO membership on service flows disaggregated by sector. We than investigate the impact of the number of commitments undertaken by sector on service flows for WTO members only. We control for the possible selection bias coming from the fact that WTO commitments are only observed for WTO members by running a Heckman two-stage selection model. First, we examine the determinants of being a WTO member using a host of institutional variables. Then, we determine the impact of the number of commitments by sector as well as the availability of those commitments by mode on trade in services. Finally, we notice an endogeneity problem arising from the fact that countries may have commitments in those sectors where they trade well. To fix it, we instrument WTO commitments with institutional variables, given that countries with better institutions are more likely to have commitments in services at the WTO.
The results show that being a WTO member boosts trade in services. In addition, the number of commitments and binding these commitments increase exports, imports and trade in services. This positive and significant effect remains robust even after controlling for several econometric issues, namely the selection bias related to the WTO membership and the endogeneity of commitments.
